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Using a calibrated two-bloc endogenous growth model of the European economy, we
assess the growth and welfare impact of East-West European migration of di®erent skill
compositions. The East has a lower total factor productivity and a lower endowment
of skilled labour. Migration can induce two growth-enhancing e®ects: an e±ciency
e®ect from the more e±cient use of labour in the West and a sectoral reallocation
e®ect from a fall in the Western skilled-unskilled wage rates. Despite growth gains
there are both winners (migrants, the representative Western non-migrant household)
and losers (the representative Eastern household remaining). Remittances can see the
latter group joining the winners.
JEL Classi¯cation: F22, F43, O41
Keywords: migration, endogenous growth, welfare, immigration surplus, emigration
de¯cit.
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01 Introduction
This paper assesses the economic impact of East-West European migration on both host
and sending regions that will result from the current enlargement of the European Union.
Our calibrated model is of the `new-growth, new-trade' genre where long-term growth is
driven by innovation in the production of new industries. The East is characterized by
a lower total factor productivity in all sectors, a relatively lower endowment of skilled
labour and a lower initial capital stock. We examine the impact of East-West European
migration of di®erent skill compositions. East-West migration induces two potentially
growth-enhancing e®ects: an e±ciency e®ect from the more e±cient use of labour in the
West and a sectoral reallocation e®ect arising from the change in the skilled-unskilled wage
rates. The ¯rst e®ect is studied by examining migration with no skill bias and the second
by examining migration of exclusively skilled labour.
East-West European migration is a politically contentious subject in the West and
welfare analysis that carefully identi¯es the winners and losers can help to inform this
debate. We distinguish the original pre-migration population in the West (the `native'
population), the migrants and those remaining in the East. Each of these groups in turn
consist of skilled and unskilled household making six groups in total. The welfare impli-
cations of migration for the native population in the host country has received particular
attention in the migration literature. In an in°uential study Borjas (1995) calculates the
`immigration surplus' as the increase in income for this group following immigration. In
a one-country study calibrated to the US economy he shows that in the simplest model
without endogenous growth, assuming ¯xed capital and homogeneous labour, a 10% in-
crease in the workforce results in a very small income-based calculation of the immigration
surplus, around 0.1% in fact. The source of this gain is that immigration lowers the wage
rate and since the host population own the capital they bene¯t overall, though there are
losers (workers) as well as winners (owners of capital). Borjas goes on to show that the
introduction of skilled and unskilled types of labour can signi¯cantly increase the immi-
gration surplus. If the skilled-unskilled labour composition of immigrants di®ers from
that of the native population a change in the relative wage enables ¯rms to change the
composition of their workforce and reach an higher isoquant without increasing the total
cost of labour. This relative wage e®ect increases the Borjas estimation of the immigration
1surplus signi¯cantly. If in addition it is assumed that skilled labour and capital are com-
plements, then the ¯nal estimation of the immigration surplus arising from an increase of
10% in the US workforce can reach around 1%.
In a static analysis then three factors contribute to the immigration surplus: the fact
natives in the West own the capital, the relative wage e®ect and the complementarity of
skilled labour and capital. In our model with endogenous growth, if migration is growth
enhancing this provides a further contribution to the immigration surplus.1 However
the work of Lundborg and Segerstrom (2000) and Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002) in a
growth model with homogeneous labour and no capital highlights an important negative
contribution from immigration as a result of a reduction in the asset value of equity issued
to ¯nance R&D. In principle this can dominate resulting in a negative immigration surplus
and indeed the results of these authors suggest this may be the case. We can reassess this
¯nding in a richer model of growth that includes physical capital and two types of labour.
As well as assessing the immigration surplus our two-bloc model allows us to estimate
the welfare e®ect on remaining households in the East{the `emigration surplus'. Our
results suggests a negative emigration surplus despite an increase in world growth that
bene¯ts East and West. This emigration de¯cit becomes particularly large in the case
of skilled emigration from the East. This de¯cit arises from two sources: following Chui
et al. (2002) the less developed East passes through di®erent stages of development as its
levels of total factor productivity and endowment of skilled labour converge to those in
the West. In the North-South model of Chui et al. (2002) we allow the South to engage
in copying and a combination of copying and innovation of blueprints produced in the
North. In our East-West model we assume that IPRs prevail ruling out copying activity.
This leaves two stages of development depending on whether there is R&D activity and
high-tech manufacturing in the East. In our pre-migration baseline calibration we assume
the East has some R&D and high-tech manufacturing. Then skilled migration reduces the
relative endowment of skilled labour in the East and pushes the structure of the East into
that with zero R&D and only traditional (low-tech) good production. Since the high-tech
1Drinkwater et al. (2007) revisits the Borjas study in an endogenous one-country endogenous growth
model along the lines of the two-bloc model of this paper. In a European context, calculations suggest
that skilled immigration can result in a utility-based immigration surplus of the order of a 4% equivalent
permanent increase in consumption, but unskilled immigration results in a negative immigration surplus.
2sector is characterized by imperfect competition and positive pro¯ts this lowers income in
the East. The second source of the emigration de¯cit arises from a drop in the unskilled-
skilled labour wage rates. Since the majority of Europe's unskilled workers live in the East
in our model, this further adds to the emigration de¯cit.
Our welfare analysis studies one mechanism that can turn the emigration de¯cit into
a surplus, namely remittances. In Drinkwater et al. (2003) evidence is presented from
20 lower and middle income countries, that include several European countries, indicat-
ing that 3.46 % of their GDP is equal to remittances. We examine the impact on the
welfare of remaining households in the East of a proportion of the income of migrants
(always the overwhelming winners in these studies) being transferred to them in the form
of consumption goods.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
theoretical literature on the e®ects of migration on growth. We mainly focus on the
contributions that links migration and growth driven by R&D, but limited space is given
to the other strands of the economic growth literature. Section 3 sets out the `core'
model without labour mobility. Section 4 sets out the balanced-growth steady state of
the dynamic model. Section 5 provides the welfare calculation for migrants, remaining
residents in the East and indigenous households in the West taking into account ownership
of assets. Each of these groups is divided into skilled and unskilled households giving six
groups in total. Section 6 describes the calibration of the model. Section 7 sets out
the numerical results and section 8 provides conclusions and some suggestions for future
developments of the model.
2 Related Literature
Many contributions to the literature on the e®ects of labour mobility on growth focus
on the impact of migration either on the source or on the receiving country. As pointed
out in Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002), the studies of labour migration in a one-country
endogenous growth framework have a series of limitations. The advantage of simplicity
is o®set by a lack in reality. In the real world countries are connected by trade in goods.
Another drawback of the one-country endogenous growth literature is that it can not take
into account the incentives for labour mobility. Finally, migration is quite likely to have
3a long lasting impact not only on the host country , but also on the source country. The
latter e®ects can be positive or negative depending on the interplay between the e®ects of
growth, remittances and the brain drain.
A vast literature has emerged since the 1980's which focus on the role of consumption
and saving decisions of households, the investment decisions of ¯rms and public policy on
long-term growth. The impact of migration and in general of skill composition on long-
term growth is analyzed within models where growth is driven by physical and human
capital accumulation or, following Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991),
through the discovery of new goods and new processes (R&D). In the latter, the impact
of the skill level on growth is far more complex than the one described in the literature
where growth is driven by capital accumulation. It is based on the incentives to engage
in R&D activities and on the possibility to use skilled migrants in a more e±cient way.
A possible way to synthesizes previous studies on the impact of migration on growth
is illustrated in the following table:
One country Two countries
Human & Physical Capital Ben-Gad (2003) Walz (1995)
Research & Development Drinkwater et al. (2007) LS, Bretscher (2001)
Table 1. Examples of Studies Linking Growth and Migration
As an example of the literature based on human capital accumulation, Walz (1995) uses
a 2-blocs endogenous growth model to address the e®ects of migration on both source and
host countries. The central idea of the work is that migration a®ects the growth rate of the
economies by altering the composition of the labour force in each country. Migration can
be bene¯cial for individuals in both countries and if migration increases the overall growth
rate, the positive dynamic e®ects o®set any negative static e®ects2 . In contrast with Walz
(1995), Ben-Gad (2003) considers a closed economy that opens only to include migration.
They extends Lucas (1988) model by introducing a labour-leisure choice. The introduction
of human capital externalities interacts with the analysis on the skill composition of the
migrants. The author shows that in the case of a modest intertemporal elasticity of labour
supply and returns to scale between 1 and 1.1, immigration lowers the growth rate in the
host economy.
2The result depends on the initial specialization pattern.
4Our paper is close to the literature that looks at the impact of migration in a 2-country
endogenous growth framework where technical change is driven by R&D (R&D and two
countries in the table) . The e®ects of migration from the South (East) to the North (West)
is examined by Lundborg and Segerstrom (2000, 2002) in a two-country quality ladders
model of economic growth and by Bretscher (2001) in an expansion-in-varieties model.
While Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002) deals with the e®ects of international migration
between developed countries on growth, Lundborg and Segerstrom (2000) investigates the
potential impact of mass migration from middle-wage to high wage countries (e.g. from
former communist countries to actual members of the EU). In particular, in this second
paper the authors look at the desirability of large immigration quotas for both sending and
receiving countries. Migration generates static and dynamic e®ects from changes in wages
and from higher growth. The dynamic e®ects are in general positive but not su±cient to
compensate the negative level e®ects which generates losers among Northern workers and
Southern capitalists3. Northern capitalist are not particularly a®ected while migrants
and Southern workers are the clear winner in the analysis. The results of a negative
impact of migration on the welfare of natives contrasts with the ¯ndings obtained through
static models of migration Borjas (1995) and suggests that the attitude of natives towards
migrants can be associated with economic fears . An important feature of Lundborg and
Segerstrom (2000) is the evaluation of the model using computer simulations. This is due
to the di±culties generated by the assumption of two asymmetric countries. We retain this
feature in our work by relating the model to typical European economies and assuming
asymmetries between the two blocs. In contrast to our work, Lundborg and Segerstrom
(2000) assume homogeneous workers in a one-sector economy.
Our work is also close to Bretscher (2001) which examines the impact of the supply
of unskilled and skilled migration on the growth rate in open economies. By assuming
a speci¯c utility function, the author shows analytically that there is an unambiguously
positive relationship between growth and an increase in the proportion of skilled labour.
Similar to our work, Bretschger assumes that the ranking of skilled labour intensiveness
in the sectors is traditional, manufacturing and R&D. In a version of this model, the
author look at an expansion-in-varieties in the production sector which explicitly consider
3This result is driven by the assumption that the di®erence in R&D productivity in the two countries
are not large.
5the impact of migration on the incentives to generate new knowledge capital. In this case
unskilled migration has clearly negative e®ects on the growth rate, while migration of high
skilled has again unambiguously positive e®ects on the growth rate. In contrast with our
work, Bretscher (2001) does not assume asymmetries between the two countries and the
growth e®ects depend only on the sectoral reallocation of resources. In our model, the
increase in labour supply in the North (West) induces both an e±ciency e®ect and a
sectoral reallocation e®ect.
The importance of the skill composition of migrants on growth is also emphasised by
Drinkwater et al. (2007). The work, through simulations on an expanding in varieties
model with physical capital, general CES utility functions and Cobb-Douglas production
technology con¯rms, in a closed economy framework, most of the analytical results in
Bretschger. The main result of this model is that growth e®ects on the Immigration
Surplus come to dominate the purely static e®ects, but they are not su±cient to eliminate
the emergence of losers among natives competing with immigrants in the labour market.
Here we review the ¯ndings in Drinkwater et al. (2007) for open economies and examine
the impact of changes in labour supply on both host and source countries.
Finally, we take into account the impact of immigration on the terms of trade of the
host economy. Davis and Weinstein (2002) claim that immigration has a negative impact
on native welfare through worsening of the terms of trade of the home economy. The
authors adopt a standard Ricardian model amended to allow migration to a country (i.e.
US or the West) which is technologically superior in all factors. The main idea of their
work is the following: when the technologically superior country opens to trade it initially
enjoyed monopoly power. Immigration then amounts to an erosion of this power. World
income increases, but natives always loose. In our paper, the native welfare e®ect of
immigration is the result of various opposing forces and the terms of trade is only one
of those. In our simulations, we can see that immigration has a negative impact on the
terms of trade of the host economy, but this is more than o®set by the positive impact on
endogenous growth.
63 The Model
In each bloc East (E) and West (W), in the absence of specialization there are four
sectors: a high-technology manufacturing sector, m, produces an expanding variety of
di®erentiated goods; a traditional traded sector, y, produces a single traded homogeneous
good (e.g., food, steel); a traditional non-traded sector, z, produces another homogeneous
good (e.g., construction, services) and an R&D innovative sector, i, produces blueprints
for new manufactured goods. Sectors m, y and z use four factor inputs consisting of
skilled labour Hb, and unskilled labour Lb, b = E; W in the aggregate, and physical
capital consisting of inputs from the two traditional sectors. The ranking of unskilled-
skilled labour intensiveness is: z, y, m and i. The assumed market structures for outputs
are competitive for the traditional and R&D sectors and monopolistic for manufacturing.
Labour markets are assumed to clear and there are no free public services. In the basic
model there is no labour mobility between East and West. Migration between these blocs
is then considered in a subsequent section of the paper.
Asymmetries between East and West are a central aspect of this study. On the de-
mand side in our analysis we allow for the possibility that parameters (such as the discount
rate) de¯ning consumer preferences di®er between the two regions. Following Parente and
Prescott (2000) we assume that both East and West have access to the same common
technologies, but the ability of ¯rms to avail themselves of the best technology di®er in
the two blocs, leading to di®erent total factor productivities. Estimates from Hall and
Jones (1999) of total factor productivities for the US and some typical East and West
European economies are given in table 1 below. Since our focus is on long-run growth,
the question arises as to whether such large TFP di®erences will persist for long in the
transitional economies. Estimates of TFP growth and labour productivity for Eastern and
Western Germany in the 1990s from Burda and Hunt (2001) show that in the ¯rst half of
the decade convergence was rapid, but in the second half it slowed down considerably leav-
ing Eastern labour productivity almost frozen at around two-thirds of that in the West.
This suggests that in the transitional economies we may expect some rapid convergence at
¯rst, but that some signi¯cant East-West TFP productivity di®erence will persist for some
considerable time. This is what we assume in our simultations. The remaining di®erences














Table 2. Labour Productivity and TFP Di®erences between Countries (Hall
and Jones, 1999)
3.1 Consumers and Aggregate Demand
In blocs b = E; W, consumers consist of two representative households. Types l = L;H,




















i = 1;¾b 6= 1;
(1)
where ½b is the subjective discount rate, ¾ < 1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, Cb
yl and Cb
zl are total consumption of the traditional traded and non-traded goods
respectively by type l; and Cb
ml, an index of consumed manufacturing goods by households








; ® 2 (0;1); (2)
4The latter however are irrelevant for the steady state results.
8due to Dixit-Stiglitz, where n is the total number of varieties available, ® is a taste pa-
rameter and xb
jl is consumption of variety j by type l in bloc b.5
The consumers' optimization problem consists of two stages. Let pmj be the price
of manufactured variety j and py, pb
z; b = E;W be the prices of the traded and non-




zl)µz over the varieties given total nominal household expenditure for





























mj0dj0; l = L; H; ; b = E;W (3)
where " = 1=(1 ¡ ®) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. Hence the total nominal


















is the price index for manufacturing. Finally the pro¯t-maximizing choice of output by
















where Cb = Cb
L + Cb
H is total households' nominal expenditure in bloc b.
The second stage of the consumers' problem is intertemporal. Net assets, Ab
l, held by
households of type l consist of an equity stake in new blueprints, domestic physical capital
in all sectors and claims on domestic and foreign residents. Arbitrage in capital markets
within each bloc ensures equality on the return rb from these assets. This implies budget












5Notice the elasticity ² = 1=(1 ¡ ®) is assumed to be equal across all varieties wherever they are
produced.
9where wb = [wb
L;wb
H] are the wage rates and [Tb
L;Tb
H] are non-distortionary taxes paid by
the two groups. Maximizing (1) subject to (2), (3) and (7) gives another standard result:
_ Cb
l =Cb









is the price index for total consumption in bloc b. Hence aggregating over the two types
of household we have
_ Cb=Cb ¡ _ Pb=Pb = ¾b(rb ¡ _ Pb=Pb ¡ ½b) (10)
The budget constraint for aggregate net assets wealth is,
_ Ab = rbAb + wb
LLb + wb
HHb ¡ Cb; (11)
In each region manufacturing ¯rms have identical costs and all ¯rms, East or West, face
an identical demand given by (6). Hence pj = pW; j = 1; 2;¢ ¢ ¢; nW and pj = pE; j =
nW + 1; nW + 2;¢ ¢ ¢; n where n = nW + nE. Then from (5) we now have that Pm =
£
nW(pW)1¡² + nE(pE)1¡²¤ 1
1¡². We can now write aggregate assets in region b as:
Ab = Ab
L + Ab
H = nbvb + pyKb
y + pb
zKb
z + Fb (12)




m are aggregate levels of physical capital created from the two traditional sectors and Fb
are net claims of bloc b on residents in the other bloc (a negative value implies a liability).
3.2 Accounting Identities and Eastern Debt
Let Bb
j ; j = y;m denote the trade balance in traded sector j. Then the accounting
identities are:
pyY b = py(Cb












10where ±y;±z;±m are the depreciation rates for the three types of capital. If ¯nancial capital
is mobile, rE = rW = r, say, and foreign assets held by each bloc accumulate according
to:
_ Fb = rFb + Bb
y + Bb
m (16)






m = 0 (17)
However open-economy models with capital mobility of this genre have some implausible
properties, discussed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, chapter 3. One way of resolving this
di±culty is to assume that the bloc that borrows is credit-constrained and can only borrow
up to its holdings of other assets; i.e., if it is the East that borrows then liabilities FW are
constrained by AE ¸ 0. With credit constraints interest rates rW and rW can diverge.




m = 0 (18)
We can set up the model to incorporate capital immobility as a special case of constrained
mobility as follows. The credit constraint takes the form:
FW · Á(nEvE + pyKE
y + pzKE
z ) = ÁaE (19)
say, where Á 2 [0;1] is the maximum proportion of Eastern assets, aE, owned by Western
households. Then (16) applies and rW = rE = r i® FW < ÁaE. Otherwise the credit
constraint binds, rW 6= rE necessarily and (16) is replaced with
Á_ aE = rWÁaE + BW
y + BW
m (20)
3.3 The Traditional Sectors
Turning to the supply side, since the traditional sectors are perfectly competitive, the
price is equal to the marginal cost. If both regions produce the traded traditional good,
global price equalization then gives the following equality
py = ¡E
y (wE;RE) = ¡w
y (wW;RW): (21)
11where ¡b
y(¢) is a cost function and Rb = [Rb
y;Rb
z] are the net costs (rental prices) of the
two types of physical capital. Equating the returns on capital to rb we have
Rb
j = pb





]; j = y;z (22)
In (21), unit cost functions ¡b
y(wb;Rb);b = E;W, for the traded traditional sector
and the corresponding unit factor requirements are given in Appendix A, and are derived
from the following, CES production function





















°jy = 1 (23)
for factor inputs [Ly;Hy;Kyy;Kzy] into the y-sector. In (23), ¾¹y = 1=(1 ¡ ¹y) is the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour, ¾»y = 1=(1 ¡ »y) is the
elasticity of substitution between the two types of physical capital and ¾´y = 1=(1¡´y) is
the elasticity of substitution between labour of either type with physical capital of either
type.6
We assume identical technology is available in both blocs apart from the total factor
productivity, Tb
y, which can di®er. We assume that the East is ine±cient relative to the
West in all sectors. If this ine±ciency is uniform across sectors, with our constant returns
to scale production functions this can be interpreted the quality of skilled, unskilled labour
and physical capital in the West being uniformly higher than in the South (in addition
to the proportion of skilled workers being higher). Alternatively (or in addition) the
ine±ciency could be caused by barriers to innovation as in Parente and Prescott(2000) in
which case it need not be uniform across sectors.
For the non-traded traditional sectors prices in each bloc can di®er and (21) becomes
pb
z = ¡b
z(wb;Rb); b = E;W (24)
where unit cost functions ¡b


















°jz = 1 (25)
6An alternative speci¯cation for the CES production function assumes a common rate of substitution



















. Then ´y > 0 and »y < 0 captures the
empirical possibility that skilled labour and physical capital are complements (Hammermesh (1993)).
12for factor inputs [Lz;Hz;Kyz;Kzz;Kmz] into the z-sector.
3.4 Manufacturing ¯rms
Given factor inputs [Lm;Hm;Kym;Kzm], production in the manufacturing sector produc-


















°jm = 1 (26)
from which the cost functions ¡b
m(wb;Rb) are derived as before.
The manufacturing ¯rm in either bloc producing variety j at price pj where j 2 [0;n]




j given by (6). For identical ¯rms in each bloc,











¼b = (1 ¡ ®)pbxb (29)
Pm =
£
nE(pE)1¡² + nW(pW)1¡²¤ 1
1¡² (30)
Notice that since ² > 1, Pm is a decreasing function of the number of varieties, n = nE+nW.
3.5 The Innovative Sector and Knowledge Capital
The innovative R&D sector employs only labour and the rate of production of new goods
invented in this sector is given by the production function


















°ji = 1 (31)
where ¤ is knowledge capital. Our treatment of knowledge capital di®ers from much
of the literature in that we adopt a formulation that does not lead to the empirically
troublesome conclusion that growth increases with population size. The basic idea is that
a new blueprint emerging in the R&D sector contains new ideas and information useful
to future generations of innovations but these di®use gradually in time and through the
population.
13Let LE + HE + LW + HW = N say, be the total world's working population. In fact,
later we normalise N = 1. Let n = nE +nW be the total number of varieties in the world.





i.e., knowledge capital depends on the density of varieties in the population and not on
the absolute number. This small change in the usual formulation (for example adopted
in G&H) removes the world population size e®ect on growth. Notice also that knowledge
capital is independent of the distribution of populations between East and West and is
therefore una®ected by migration.
3.6 The Financial Sector
Let the stock market value of the typical R&D ¯rm in bloc b be denoted by vb. A new










vb = rb (34)
the left hand side is the total rate of return to equity holders (dividend plus capital gains)




vb < rb (35)
then no innovative goods are created in bloc b.
3.7 Factor Equilibrium Conditions




_ nb + ab
Lmnbxb + ab
LyY b + ab
LzZb = Lb (36)
aHi
¤
_ nb + ab
Hmnbxb + ab
HyY b + ab
HzZb = Hb (37)




_ nb + ab
Kymnbxb + ab





_ nb + ab
Kzmnbxb + ab
KzyY b + ab
KzzZb = Kz
b (39)









which completes the speci¯cation of the core model for given Lb;Hb.






























Cb = (1 ¡ ¾b)
_ Pb
Pb + ¾b(rb ¡ ½b) (v)
Aggregate Demand
pyY b = py(Cb





z + _ Kb
z + ±zKb






Ab = nbvb + pyKb
y + pb
zKb
z + Fb = ab + Fb (ix)







Eastern Debt and World Balanced Trade Condition
if FW < Áae then rW = rE = r and _ FW = rWFW + BW
y + BW
m







m = 0 (xii)
Capital Returns
Rb



























































_ nb + ab
Lmnbxb + ab
LyY b + ab
LzZb = Lb (xxiv)
aHi
¤
_ nb + ab
Hmnbxb + ab
HyY b + ab




_ nb + ab
Kymnbxb + ab





_ nb + ab
Kzmnbxb + ab
KzyY b + ab
KzzZb = Kz
b (xxvii)
16Assume (xxii) holds with equality so innovation occurs in both blocs. Four of these
equations, (xi), (xii), (xix) and (xxiii) refer to the world, the remaining 23 to each bloc.
For the case where the credit constraint binds, this gives us 4 + 2 £ 23 = 50 equations
in total in endogenous variables Cb
z;Cb
y;Cb











z, b = E;W and py;Pm;¤ which total 23 £ 2 + 3 = 49
variables. Where the credit constraint does not bind rW = rE but we have one more
endogenous variable FW.
There appears to be too many equations. However our general equilibrium model
describes an equilibrium in world traded output, and in non-traded output, the ¯nan-
cial sector and labour markets in each bloc. By Walras' law we know one of the latter
equilibrium conditions is in each bloc super°uous. If we eliminate one ¯nancial market
relationship describing Ab then we can dispense with equation (ix) reducing the equations
by 4 and the variables by 2. In fact, for the case of capital immobility with Bb = 0
from (ix) and (x) and (xxii), a little algebra gives









which is a national income identity equating expenditure (Cb) and investment in shares
issued to ¯nance new blue prints (vb _ nb) plus investment in physical capital with labour
income plus pro¯ts. Therefore, we can dispense with (ix) and (x). This leaves us with 46
equations in 47 endogenous variables { one equation short. However, there is nothing to
pin down the price level in our model and we are free to choose any nominal variable as
the numeraire.
4 The Steady State
Assume consumer preferences are identical in East and West. We also con¯ne ourselves to
the case of capital immobility (i.e, Á = 0 in (xi). We seek a balanced-growth steady state in
which shares of manufacturing varieties »b = nb
n are constant, the growth of varieties in the
world produced by each bloc are equal and constant; i.e., _ n=n = _ nE=nE = _ nW=nW = g,
all prices, wage rates, nominal consumption, nominal output and total nominal ¯nancial
wealth (nv) are all constant. Then we have _ vb=vb = ¡g ;b = E;W, _ P=P = µmg=(1 ¡ ²) =
¡µmg(1 ¡ ®)=® < 0 and ¤ = n=N. Let Xb = nbxb be manufacturing output. Then the
17steady state takes the form










Ab = nbvb + pyKb + pb

























m = 0 (49)
RE
y = RW
y = py(r + ±) (50)
Rb
z = pb
z(r + ±) (51)


























»E + »W = 1 (57)
giving 30 equations in 30 variables g, r, Ry, py and Ab, pb






z, wb = [wb
L;wH]b, b = E;W. We choose nominal GDP as the numeraire. Exogenous
parameters driving the equilibrium are ½, ®, ¾, µm, µy (describing the preferences of
consumers), the depreciation rates ±, technology parameters Tb
j , °kj, ´j, »j; k = 1; 2;¢¢¢;3,
j = y;z;m;i, for the four sectors of the traditional good, manufacturing and R&D and
exogenous endowment proportions Lb and Hb.
The additional relationship which is rendered super°uous by Walras' Law is








mXb + pyY b + pb
zZb (59)
18in the steady state. De¯ne as proportions of nominal GDP mb = pb
mXb=GDPb and
similarly de¯ne yb and zb for bloc b = E;W. De¯ne the R&D and consumption shares as
rdb = 1 ¡ xb ¡ yb ¡ zb = ¡b
i»bg=GDPb and cb = Cb=GDPb respectively. De¯ne relative


















































































































y (r + ±)
RW
z = pW
z (r + ±)
RE
z = pE




(r + g)rdW = (1 ¡ ®)mWg
(r + g)rdE = (1 ¡ ®)mEg

















® , py = ¡b
y and pb
z = ¡b
z, this gives us 18 equations in endogenous
variables xb, yb, zb, cb, wageLb, wageHb, Rb
z (b = E;W), Ry, r, relE and g. When there
is no R&D in the East then rdE = xE = 0. Nominal Western GDP is chosen as our
numeraire.
195 Immigration and Welfare
We now turn to the balanced growth steady state of the full model as set above. Our
calculations of the immigration surplus are based on pre- and post-migration equilibria and
require distinguishing between the asset accumulation of migrants and the host country
workers.
5.1 Asset Accumulation following Migration
At time t let Ml(t); l = L;H be the numbers of Eastern households of type l who have
migrated in the post-migration state. Let ¹ Lb and ¹ Hb be the pre-migration levels of post-
migration steady states of the two skill types. Then the working populations of the two
skill types are given by
LE = ¹ LE ¡ ML ; LW = ¹ LW + ML
HE = ¹ HE ¡ MH ; HW = ¹ HW + MH (60)
We make no distinction between the worker of the same skill type in the two blocs.
Nor do we allow for discrimination against immigrants in the Western labour market. As
a consequence the only change on the supply side arises from the numbers of workers of
each type. However the consumption/savings decisions of the migrants must be considered
separately.
Following migration starts we need consider three residential groups of workers: mi-
grants who have settled in the West; the remaining residents in the East and non-migrants
in the West. We use a superscript q = M;N;E to refer to these these groups. Thus West-








l . Assume that migrants accumulate their assets in the West. Aggregating




H, q = M;N;E and Ab = Ab
L+Ab
H, and
similarly for consumption, the household budget constraints for migrants, non-migrants
in the West and remaining workers in the East are then given by
_ AM = rWAM + wW
L ML + wW
H MH ¡ TM ¡ CM (61)
_ AN = rWAN + wW
L (LW ¡ ML) + wW
H (HW ¡ MH) ¡ TN ¡ CN (62)
_ AE = rEAE + wE
LLE + wE
HHE ¡ TE ¡ CE (63)
20Aggregating (61) and (62) gives
_ AW = rWAW + wW
L LW + wW
H HW ¡ CW (64)
where Tq are taxes paid by group q. Thus, with our three assumptions { homogeneous
labour of the same skill type between blocs, no discrimination against immigrants and
migrants invest their assets with in the West { the budget constraints, consumption and
savings decisions aggregate in a straightforward manner. The only economic e®ect on the
aggregate economies arises from the change in working populations given by (60). However
the welfare of our six groups need to be calculated separately and this requires that the
assets of each group are carefully identi¯ed following migration from East to West.
Total assets in the West of which groups q = N;M have some share are given by
¹ AW = ¹ »W ¹ ¡i + ¹ py ¹ Ky
W + ¹ pW
z ¹ Kz
W in the pre-migration state owned by the total pre-
migration population) and AW = »W¡i + pyKW
y + pW
z KW
z after migration that increases
the total Western population to NW = (1 + M) ¹ NW where M = ML+MH
¹ NW is the total
migration rate. First consider the accumulation of the physical capital component of these
assets. For the y-sector, after migration, in the new steady state KW
y ¡ ¹ KW
y of capital
accumulates which now has value py(KW
y ¡ ¹ KW
y ). Migrants don't bring capital with them,
but do save and share in the newly accumulated capital and acquire M
1+Mpy(KW
y ¡ ¹ KW)
leaving non-migrants with their initial holding, now valued at py and their share of the
new capital, 1
1+Mpy(KW ¡ ¹ KW). Treating capital in the z-sector and equity similarly we
arrive at the total assets of Western non-migrants and migrants as
AN =


































Finally we need to divide assets between skilled and non-skilled households within






L ¹ LW + ¹ wW
H ¹ HW





L ¹ LW + ¹ wW
H ¹ HW
¹ AN
in the pre-migration state with an analogous division in the post-migration state. We have
now determined holdings of assets for skilled and unskilled non-migrants in the West,
21migrants and non-migrants remaining in the East before and after migration. We now
turn to the calculations of welfare for these six groups.
5.2 Welfare Calculations
Given steady state assets and labour income we can now determine total consumption of
unskilled non-migrants from (62) in the pre-migration state as
¹ CN
L = ¹ r ¹ AN
L + ¹ w¹ L ¡ TN
L
with obvious analogous expressions for the post-migration state, for skilled non-migrants
and for the other four group, q = M;E l = L;H. We are now in a position to calculate
the immigration surplus based on the change in utility following migration














µi = 1;¾ 6= 1;
Consider T periods after migration and assume T is large enough for the model to have
reached its new balanced-growth steady state. Then _ n=n = g, its steady state value, or







l = ~ P)1¡1=¾n(T)µm(1¡1=¾)=("¡1)






























To calculate the welfare based immigration surplus we compare the utility before and
after migration at the same pre-migration level of varieties, n(T) = ¹ n, say. We measure
this change in utility in terms of an equivalent permanent consumption change as follows.
Let ¢U
q
l be change in utility coming about from a 1% permanent change in consumption
at the pre-migration steady state at n(T) = ¹ n calculated by perturbing consumption in
(67). Then using the notation indicated in the latter equation, the immigration surplus




l ; ¹ n;g) ¡ UN
l ( ¹ CN
l ; ¹ n; ¹ g)
¢UN
l
; l = L;H (68)
22Note that this expression is independent of our choice of ¹ n. Similarly we de¯ne the welfare
gain in terms of equivalent permanent changes in consumption for the migrants and the




l ; ¹ n;g) ¡ UM
l ( ¹ CM
l ; ¹ n; ¹ g)
¢UM
l




l ; ¹ n;g) ¡ UE
l ( ¹ CE
l ; ¹ n; ¹ g)
¢UE
l
; l = L;H (70)
6 Results
We now turn to numerical solutions of the steady state using the calibrated parameter
values set out in table 1. Please refer to Appendix A for details on the calibration pro-
cedure. For a particular choice of TFP in the East we examine the e®ect of East-West
migration with di®erent skill compositions.
6.1 East-West Migration
In the next two sections we consider the second case where the East is relatively less
endowed with skilled labour with LW = HW = 0:25, whereas LE = 0:3 and HE = 0:2. In
addition TFP is less in the East and we put TFPW = 1:75TFPE.
6.1.1 Migration with no Skill Bias
Figures 1 and 2 shows the e®ect of a 10% increase in the Western population from immi-
gration with no skill bias in its composition. An increase in growth now occurs of 0.25%
which is almost entirely the result of a movement of workers from a country with a low
TFP to one with a high TFP. All sectors in the West grow as they absorb the immigrant
workers. The transfer of workers from a less to a more e±cient R%D sector sees the
Western share of new products rise and world growth rises. The consequent increase in
demand for high skill labour causes the relative skill-unskilled wage in both blocs to rise.
There is a small rise in the Western R&D share rdW and a small decrease`in rdW.
The e®ect of these changes on welfare is summarised in ¯gure 1, (b) to (e). Figure 1(e)
shows the world surplus worked out as the equivalent % permanent change in consumption
for a representative household consisting of skilled and unskilled workers, East and West at
weighted according to post-migration proportions. The maximum world surplus is around
239% when migration reaches 10% of the Western workforce. This breaks down into 1% for
Western skilled workers, about 0.5% for native unskilled workers, giving an immigration
surplus of around 0.85% for the representative Western native household (¯gure 1b). For
those remaining in the East skilled workers gain by over 0.75%, unskilled workers lose by
-1.35% giving an emigration de¯cit for the representative Eastern non-migrant of about
-1.2% (¯gure 1c). Finally ¯gure 1(d) shows that the representative migrant gains by a
substantial 200%.
6.1.2 Skilled Migration with Remittances
Our next set of simulations in ¯gures 3 and 4 look at the e®ect of a 10% increase in the
Western population consisting of skilled workers. Now there are additional reallocation
e®ects in both blocs arising from the changes in the proportions of skilled to unskilled
workers. Taken together with the e±ciency e®ect of a movement from a less to a more
e±cient economy, growth now rises by over 0.5% (¯gure 3a). The world surplus now rises
to 11% (¯gure 3e). The immigration surplus is almost 12% for unskilled natives, -2.5%
for skilled natives averaging at almost 6 % (¯gure 3b). The emigration surplus is 17% for
skilled, -50% for unskilled averaging at -10% (¯gure 3c), but both skilled and unskilled
migrants gain substantially again (¯gure 3c).
The main result that is emerging is that migration of all types of workers from a
low to a high TFP region of the world can increase growth, but in the absence of some
distribution mechanism there are winners and losers, with remaining non-migrants in the
latter category. The reason is that the East sees a reduction in its share of high tech goods
which involve a price mark-up over marginal cost, and the relative wage of the unskilled
workers fall. Indeed from ¯gure 4b skilled migration of over 5% of the West workforce sees
the R&D and high-tech sectors disappear altogether in the East.
One possible distribution mechanism is through remittance between migrants and their
families remaining in the East. We then look at the e®ects of skilled migrants remitting
a given percentage of their income ranging between 0% and 50%. Assuming that fami-
lies are either entirely skilled or unskilled, these remittances will end up in the pocket of
skilled households in the East. This group were winners in the absence of remittances so
remittances in themselves do not mitigate the distributional e®ects of migration. However
24if we assume that intra-country distributional mechanisms exist, or that households are of
mixed skilled type, then we can focus on the representative household in both blocs. Then
we can show that at any remittance rate above around 35%, migrants remain substantial
winners, and the Eastern representative household begins to emerge as a winner. These
welfare e®ects with remittances are summarized in table 3.
Type of Migration Growth E®ect (%) IS (%) ES (%)
Unbiased 0.3 0.85 -1.2
Skilled 0.5 5.5 -8.0
Skilled with 50% remittances 0.5 5.5 7
Table 3. Growth, Immigration Surplus (IS), Emigration Surplus (ES) of Rep-
resentative Households.
Finally, ¯gure 5 describes the e®ect of high skilled migration on the terms of trade of
the host country. The change in the proportion of skilled to unskilled workers, together
with the increase in Western population, has a negative impact on the terms of trade of
Western countries. Please refer to Appendix B for details on the terms of trade.
7 Conclusions and Future Research
Our results may be summarised as follows
1. This paper examines the impact of East-West European migration of di®erent skill
compositions where the East is characterized by a lower TFP and a lower skill-
unskilled labour ratio calibrated to reproduce observed di®erences in the size of the
traditional and high-tech sectors in the two regions.
2. East-West migration induces two e®ects: an e±ciency e®ect from the more e±cient
use of labour in the West and a sectoral reallocation e®ect arising from the change in
the skilled-unskilled wage rates. The ¯rst e®ect is studied by examining migration
with no skill bias and the second by examining migration of exclusively skilled labour.
3. Both types of migration result in a increase in world growth in the steady state.
Skilled-labour migration results in a shift out of the high-tech sector in the East
so that eventually at a level of migration over to 5% of the Western population
25that sector disappears altogether. Then Eastern specialization in traditional sectors
occurs.
4. Despite growth gains there are winners and losers. With skilled migration, skilled
households gain in the East and lose out in the West. The representative West
household gains but its Eastern counterpart loses out. The overwhelming winner
is the migrant herself. An important redistributive mechanism that can mitigate
these distributional e®ects is the existence of remittances. In our simulations a
remittance rate of around 35% still leaves the skilled migrant better of and sees the
representative household in the East joining her counterpart in the West as a winner.
There are a number of ways in which the model presented here can be developed. First,
our model of the migration decision results in a migration equilibrium that is implausibly
sensitive to very small changes in Eastern relative TFP. Alternative ways of modelling this
decision to capture migration sluggishness observed in previous enlargements, needs to be
explored. Second, we have assumed away labour market imperfections. There are many
ways of modelling these: the search-matching approach to migration and wage-stickiness
of Ortega(2000) is one promising direction to go. Third, ¯scal instruments can be made
available to the policy-maker such as a migrants' tax. Fourth, there are unexplored issues
associated with the modelling of endogenous growth. The removal of scale e®ects can be
handled in other ways (see, for example, Segerstrom, 1998, Li 2000). We have restricted
capital formation to traditional sectors for theoretical convenience. It is not obvious how
to obtain balanced growth paths with constant prices if we allow for capital formation in
the high-tech expanding sector and this needs to be investigated further.
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28A Calibration
To relate the model to the European economies, the ¯rst requirement of the exercise is
to identify which types of labour relate to the categories of `skilled' and unskilled' and
which sectors constitute traditional, high-tech manufacturing and R&D. We will assume
identical consumer preferences for migrants and non-migrants.
To carry out the simulations the following parameter values are required:
Utility Weights, Elasticities and Discount Rates: µm;µy, ¾;® and ½.
Capital Depreciation Rate: ±.
Production Function Weights, Elasticities and Total Factor Productivities:
°kj; k = 1;3; j = m;y;i, ´j; »j;j = m;y;i, Tj; j = m;y;i.
Pre-Migration unskilled and skilled labour proportions: (¹ L; ¹ H)
The procedure commonly referred to as the `microeconomic approach' to calibration
(see, for example the discussion in Shoven and Whalley (1992) chooses values for weights
in utility and production functions to be consistent with observations of data in the form
of averages of sector shares, factor shares within each sector, the real interest rate and the
growth rate over a number of years. Elasticities in production are selected using economet-
ric estimates. Our baseline calibration assumes Cobb-Douglas production technology, but
in order to investigate the case where skilled labour and capital are complements rather






j + (1 ¡ °1j)[°2jH
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in sector j = y;m;i where Yj denotes output in sectors j = y;m and _ n=¤ in the innovative
sector. Then all the parameters are re-calibrated so that the steady state of the model
is consistent with the original data. Notice we assume ¹ and ´ are the same in all three
sectors.
We use econometric estimates for ¾ and depreciation rates, and various sources on
price mark-ups for ®. From Appendix C the following are chosen: ¾ = 0:4, ± = 0:1 and
® = 0:7. In the pre-migration equilibrium this leaves parameters [Ti;½;µm;f°kjg; k =
1;2; j = y;m;i] = £, say, to calibrate. Then µy = 1 ¡ µm completes the calibration.
On the production side, units of output and factor inputs can be chosen such that Tm =
29Ty = 1.7 Let sLj, sHj be the factor shares of unskilled and skilled workers respectively
in sector j = i;m;y as evaluated in the balanced growth steady state of our model.
Denote data for these shares by ^ sLj, ^ sHj. Let d pmX
pyY be data for the relative nominal
outputs in the manufacturing and traditional sectors respectively. Similarly let data on
the real interest rate, the long-term growth rate be denoted by ^ r and ^ g respectively. Given
parameters £, we can then solve for the balanced growth steady state with values g(£),
r(£), pm(£)X(£), py(£)Y (£), sLj(£), sHj(£), j = i;m;y. Given data for these variables
we can then solve
g(£) = ^ g
r(£) = ^ r
sLj(£) = ^ sLj ; j = i;m;y






To calibrate ml we use estimates of migration °ows provided by a number of sources.
Then we solve the model with ML and MH ¯xed at these estimates, say ^ ML and ^ MH to
give utilities uM
l ( ^ ML, ^ MH) and uE
l ( ^ ML, ^ MH). Then from (??) we calibrate ml as
ml =
uM
l ( ^ ML; ^ MH) ¡ uE
l ( ^ ML; ^ MH)
uE
l ( ^ ML; ^ MH
l = L;H (A.1)
7We choose units of output, skilled and unskilled labour and capital such that Lj = Hj = Kj = 1
results in one unit of output in sector j = y;m. Then in our constant returns to scale CES production
function we have that Tj = 1.
30Data Value Source
^ r 0.03 stylized
^ g 0.07 stylized
pmX 0.36 Burda and Hunt (2001)
pyY 0.64 Burda and Hunt (2001)
sLy 0.27 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
sHy 0.43 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
sLm 0.17 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
sHm 0.50 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
sLi 0.076 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
sHi 0.882 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
Table 1. Data used in Calibration
For data, we choose ^ r = 0:03 and ^ g = 0:07. Since all growth in our model is concentrated
in the manufacturing sector of size µm, this gives long-term GDP growth as µm^ g = 2:4%
in our calibration. The remaining data on factor and sector shares are discussed in the
WP version of this paper and summarized in Table 1. Table 2 summarizes the baseline
calibration.
In our results the size of the R&D sector is around 5%. In the WP version of this
paper we review estimates of the size of the R&D which suggest a value around only 2%.
However some R&D must be contained within unobserved `intangible' investment which
Parente and Prescott (2000) suggest may be as high as 40% of GDP. The size of actual as
opposed to observed R&D in our model is therefore not implausible. Note also that our
simulations show a skilled/unskilled wage ratio of 2:1 which is reasonable, given the broad
de¯nition of `skilled' labour that makes it half the working population.
31Parameter Value Source
¹ H 0.5 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
¹ L 0.5 ditto
¾ 0.4 Ogaki and Reinhart (1998)
® 0.7 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
± 0.1 Canova and Ortega (1996)




°ky ; k = 1;2 °1y = 0:27, °2y = 0:59 Calibrated
°km ; k = 1;2 °1m = 0:17, °2m = 0:60 Calibrated
°ki ; k = 1;2 °1i = 0:076, °2i = 0:95 Calibrated
Table 2. Summary of Baseline Calibration
B Terms of trade
On the terms of trade, ¯rst consider a price index of traded goods:
Pb
T = (pb




















and ¿E ´ 1
¿W . Hence if wE = wW = w, say, which we assume in our calibration, then the









and therefore the price of the traditional traded goods have no impact on the terms of
trade. If preference parameters di®er this is no longer the case.






















































(b) IMMIGRA TION SURPLUS





























(c) EMIGRA TION SURPLUS































(d) MIGRA TION SURPLUS









































Figure 1: No-Skill bias migration with Pre-Migration Labour: HE = 0:20; LE =
0:30; HW = LW = 0:25; TFPE = 0:5TFPW







































(a) WESTERN SECTOR SHARES







































(b) EASTERN SECTOR SHARES






















































(c) RELA TIVE W AGE RA TES






























































Figure 2: No-Skill bias Migration with Pre-Migration Labour: HE = 0:20; LE =
0:30; HW = LW = 0:25; TFPE = 0:5TFPW






















































(b) IMMIGRA TION SURPLUS
































(c) EMIGRA TION SURPLUS


















































































Figure 3: High Skilled Migration with Pre-Migration Labour: HE = 0:20; LE =
0:30; HW = LW = 0:25; TFPE = 0:5TFPW







































(a) WESTERN SECTOR SHARES







































(b) EASTERN SECTOR SHARES






















































(c) RELA TIVE W AGE RA TES






























































Figure 4: High Skilled Migration with Pre-Migration Labour: HE = 0:20; LE =
0:30; HW = LW = 0:25; TFPE = 0:5TFPW















Figure 5: Term of Trade. Pre-Migration: HE = 0:20; LE = 0:30; HW = LW = 0:25;
TFPW = 1:75TFPE
37